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Abstract
We argue that the recently published by Przystawa and Wolf model
of the Bagsik financial oscillator is oversimplified and unrealistic. We
propose and analyze a refined explanation of this rare financial phe-
nomenon. We have found an example that results in profitability about
45 000 times bigger than that of the Przystawa and Wolf model.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r, 02.50.Le, 05.70.-a
1 Introduction
In a recent paper [1] Przystawa and Wolf discuss an algorithm (denoted
below as sbO) that, if exploited in the plunged in hyper-inflation Poland
of the early nineties, should bring enormous profits. This algorithm make
the most of constancy of the exchange ratio between two currencies, dollar
(USD) and Polish z loty (PLN), and interest rates. Przystawa and Wolf sug-
gest that Polish contractor Bagsik made his enormous fortune by exploiting
such mechanisms (a version of financial oscillator denoted sbO0.7, see below).
We would like to argue that this is not justified because the real profits from
the use of the oscillator sbO0.7 do not result in substantial magnification of
the capital. We propose a different explanation of the Bagsik rapid enrich-
ment based on a different capital source (the appropriate oscillator will be
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denoted as sbO1.93). Due to the polemic character of the article we will refer
to numerical data and time spread discussed in Ref. [1].
2 Logarithmic discount rates
To determine discount rates (or interest rates for deposits) in the inter-
val between the moments k,m ∈ N, k < m banks use a discount factor
U(k,m) ∈ R+. The lengths of the intervals in question are not necessary
the same if measured in physical units of time. This means that the bank
lends the amount of 1 at the moment k on return of the amount of Uc(k,m)
at the moment m. Analogously, if the amount of 1 is deposited at the mo-
ment k then the bank gives back the amount of Ud(k,m) at the moment m.
Profitability of bank activities implies the inequality Uc(k,m) > Ud(k,m).
The discount factor is a monotone function, U(m,m + k) > 1, and ful-
fills the condition of multiplicativity U(k, l)U(l,m) = U(k,m). Of course,
U(m,m) = 1. It is convenient to make use of the notion of logarithmic rates
R(k,m) := lnU(k,m) because their properties are more legible and calcula-
tions are simpler. The appropriate properties take the form R(m,m+k) > 0,
R(m,m) = 0, and
R(k, l) +R(l,m) = R(k,m). (1)
3 The slow bond oscillator
Let us suppose that an arbitrageur has at his disposal two banks, A and B.
The first one is ready to lend on the basis of the logarithmic rate RA(k,m).
The second one accepts deposits on the basis of the rateRB(k, b). In addition
let RA(m,m + k) ≪ RB(m,m + k). The arbitrageur aims at borrowing
capital from A and depositing the capital in B so that the financial gain will
be the highest possible. The authors of Ref. [1] focused their attention on
the following algorithm (sbO) which, in their opinion, should explain Bagsik
unheard-of financial achievements in Poland during 1990.
moment 0: The banker A estimates that the assets of X (say his premises)
would be worth 1 at the moment N , so he lends him the amount of
e−RA(0,N) (say a mortgage loan). The arbitrageur X is obliged to give
back A the amount of 1 at the moment N . The banker B offers for a
deposit of 1 at the moment 0 the amount of eRB(0,N) to be paid at the
moment N . This means that the banker B enters into the obligation
to pay X
p0 := e
RB(0,N)−RA(0,N) (2)
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at the moment N which is testified by issuing an appropriate bond to
X.
moment k: By accepting the new bond, the banker A finds out that the
present revealed assets of X (he already has bonds for previously re-
vealed assets) will be worth pk−1 at the moment N . Therefore A pays
the amount of e−RA(k,N)pk−1 to X. The banker B, following the above
rules, accepts the deposit of e−RA(k,N)pk−1 and issues the bond to re-
turn the additional amount of
pk := e
RB(k,N)−RA(k,N)pk−1 (3)
to X at the moment N .
The multiple issued by the banker B bond (certificate) allows the arbi-
trageur X to retrieve the stated amount of money from B. The recurrence
formula (3) states the banal fact that to know the figures stated on the
k-th bond it is sufficient to multiply the amount from the previous one by
the capitalization factor eRB(k,N)−RA(k,N). The initial condition (2) leads
to pN−1 = e
∑
N−1
m=0
(RB(m,N)−RA(m,N)) stated on the last, issued just before
end the arbitrage, bond. This is the only one bond that is not forwarded
to A. The rest of the issued by B bonds is used for securing the obligations
of X with respect to A originated at the moments k = 1, . . . , N−1. If X
buys a mortgage pledge from A at the moment N then he has, besides the
premises, the funds
e
∑
N−1
m=0
(RB(m,N)−RA(m,N)) − 1 (4)
at his disposal. It is worth noticing that, the banks A and B may be
physically different market institutions. The whole property of X is worth
e
∑
N−1
m=0
(RB(m,N)−RA(m,N)) at the moment N so the logarithmic rate of return
of the arbitrage is
RBA(0, N) =
N−1∑
m=0
(
RB(m,N)−RA(m,N)
)
. (5)
We set it in a different type to denote that RBA are not additive. The
lack of additivity characterizes all aggressive techniques of arbitrage. The
additivity of the rates R(k,m) allows to simplify the formula (5)
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RBA(0, N) =
N−1∑
m=0
N−1∑
k=m
(
RB(k, k + 1)−RA(k, k + 1)
)
(6)
=
N∑
k=1
k
(
RB(k − 1, k)−RA(k − 1, k)
)
. (7)
If all the intervals are uniformly distributed, that is the differences RB(k −
1, k)−RA(k−1, k) are equal then RB(k−1, k)−RA(k−1, k) =
1
N
(
RB(0, N)−
RA(0, N)
)
and the appropriate rate RBA(0, N) is given by
RBA(0, N) =
N + 1
2
(
RB(0, N) −RA(0, N)
)
. (8)
We will call such oscillators uniform sbOs. The assets ofX who accomplishes
a uniform sbO are given by the formula (cf. (4))
e
N+1
2
(RB(0,N)−RA(0,N)) − 1 (9)
which is equivalent to the one given in Ref. [1] (Eq. (16)). If RB(0, N)
is the highest available in discussed interval deposit rate then the uniform
arbitrage is profitable under the condition that RBA(0, N) is greater than
RB(0, N) which implies N >
RB(0,N)+RA(0,N)
RB(0,N)−RA(0,N)
. Let us note that the profit
given by (5) may be achieved only if there is a closing warranty (CW ), that
is a possibility of instantaneous transfer of all bonds and the related capitals
at the moment N .
4 Bagsik oscillator
A physicist would probably say that the presented method of arbitrage (sbO)
resembles less an oscillator than the repeating mechanism of a mysterious
heat engine driven by two thermal baths with the temperatures RB and
RA, respectively. The highest efficiency of such engines (without chang-
ing constructions) is reached for RB = Rmin and RA = Rmax that is for
the, respectively, lowest and highest rates of return during a given interval.
Przystawa and Wolf claim that the mechanism sbO0.8−0.1, with the ther-
mal bath in the shape of a deposit in a Polish bank (the currency PLN,
the one year rate RB = 0.8) and the reservoir created by a credit (the cur-
rency USD and the one year rate RB = 0.1). The exchange ratio of PLN
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to USD was constant during that time. The two currencies were needed
only to show that the accomplishing of the oscillator was impossible with-
out the constancy of exchange ratio. They forgot that there were available
more interesting ”financial thermostats” at that moment. The present au-
thors think that the hottest Rmax and the coldest Rmin rates were offered
by the hyper-inflation itself. The average prices of non-edible goods raised
by 591.2% according to the official state data [2] which gives the logarith-
mic rate R∗ equal to ln 6.912 ≃ 1.93 (with respect to PLN). The prices of
services raised much more: by 780.7% which gives Rmax = ln 8.807 ≃ 2.18.
The rate RA = Rmin = 0 was also available: it was possible not to repay
an interest free debt in PLN because the undergoing revolutionary changes
Polish law did not offer any mechanism of execution of debts revalued by
the inflation rate at that moment. Let us select the prices of non-edible
goods as the ”heat source” of the oscillator Rb = R∗ (it seems to be dif-
ficult to use services for doing this). The so defined oscillator sbO1.93 had
a closing warranty build-in. The bank A formed sellers and the role of the
bank B was performed by a belonging to X firm. X simply put off the
due payment for the purchased goods till the moment N . The owned by X
firm formed a reservoir of goods and immovables any other activity (e. g.
production) was inessential. At the moment N the execution of CW was
immediate: one queue formed horrified creditors and a second one formed
consumers wanting to get rid of theirs cash. The circle was closed by the
lawful deferred payment (one could induce directors of state-owned firms to
enter such formally legal but tragic in effects contracts). The generally ac-
cessible archive of the Polish internet journal Donosy [3] reports that at the
beginning of the year 1990 (2 of January) the interests of demand deposits
were at the level of 7% a year and the three-tears deposits – 38%. Only
at the end of the year (13 of December) the interest rates of the one-year
deposits raised to 60%. Therefore if we take that a PLN deposit gave a
return of 50% on average in 1990 the number would be overestimated. The
logarithmic rate of such deposits was not RB(0, N) = 0.8, as is supposed in
the Ref. [1], but ln 1.5 ≃ 0.4. This means that the suggested mechanism
led to Bagsik’s return described by the oscillator sbO0.3 and not by sbO0.7.
The profits given by the formula (4) for the oscillators sbO0.7, sbO0.3 and
sbO1.93 are presented in the Table 1. The first column is also given in the
Ref. [1]. Note that for N = 12 the return of sbO1.93 is about 45 000 times
bigger than that of sbO0.3 !
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RB(0,N)−RA(0,N)= 0.7 0.3 1.93
N = 1 1.0138 0.34986 5.8895
2 1.8577 0.56831 17.084
3 3.0552 0.82212 46.465
4 4.7546 1.1170 123.59
5 7.1662 1.4596 326.01
6 10.588 1.8577 857.34
7 15.445 2.3201 2252.0
8 22.336 2.8574 5912.5
9 32.116 3.4817 15521
10 45.993 4.2070 40740
11 65.686 5.0497 1.0694×105
12 93.632 6.0287 2.8069×105
Table 1: Profits made from a unit of capital for the arbitrage sbO
5 The slow cash oscillator
An arbitrageur performing sbO wastes a substantial amount of time between
the moments k−1 and k (k = 1, . . . , N−1) on delivering bonds to the banker
A. We will denote the average amount of time needed for this delivery
by τB→A. The authors of [1] suggest the possibility of realization of an
arbitrage sbO in Poland of 1990 if the bank A gives credits in USD and
the bank B accepts deposits in PLN. Only the bank B could have operated
on the territory of Poland because credits in USD where then unavailable.
Therefore, for obvious reasons, the interval τB→A was considerably shorter
than τA→B during which the arbitrager X transports, avoiding interference
from the more and more suspicious customers, more and more capital from
A to B in the shape of goods or cash. (The interval τA→B is equal zero for
the discussed in the previous section oscillator sbO1.93 because B = X.) We
will ignore the necessity of showing the source of CW and suppose that it
was known to the authors of the Ref. [1]. If τA→B ≫ τB→A ≃ 0 then the
algorithm sbO should be replaced by the following one (scO):
moment 0: The banker A estimates that the assets of X would be worth
1 at the moment N , so he lends him the amount of p0 = e
−RA(0,N).
The arbitrageur X is obliged to give back A the amount of 1 at the
moment N .
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moment k: The banker B offers for a deposit of pk−1 at the moment k
the amount of eRB(k,N)pk−1 in the form of a bond becoming due at the
moment N . If k < N−1 then the banker A takes this bond as a deposit
and pays to X the amount pk := e
RB(k,N)−RA(k,N)pk−1.
If we take for granted the existence of CW then by repeating the calculation
performed for sbO we easily get the profit made by X from the arbitrage
eRB(N−1,N)
N−2∏
k=1
eRB(k,N)−RA(k,N)e−RA(0,N) − 1
= e
∑
N−1
k=0
(RB(k,N)−RA(k,N))eRA(N−1,N)−RB(0,N) − 1.
The profit is smaller than RBA(0, N) because it equals
RBA(0, N) − (RB(0, N)−RA(N − 1, N)). (10)
In the case of a uniform arbitrage the logarithmic rate of return is N+12 (RB(0, N)−
RA(0, N)) − RB(0, N) +
RA(,N)
N
. Therefore the hypothetical two-currencies
variant of the Bagsik oscillator with CW should result in smaller profits
than those of the oscillator sbO0.3 (presented in the Table 1). The non-
multiplicative capitalization coefficient, U(0, N), for scO0.3 (N ≤ 12) is
smaller 26-36% than the one corresponding to the arbitrage sbO0.3 (e
RA(0,1)−RB(0,1) ≃
0.741, eRA(11,12)−RB(0,12) ≃ 0.676). Effectively, the profit is the same as in
sbO0.3 but shortened by one step.
We may consider a whole one-parameter family of arbitrage procedures λO
for N full cycles, where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the quotient of lengths of the character-
istic intervals, λ = τA→B
τB→A
, τA→B + τB→A=1. For example, in the case when
X obtains from A a letter of credit ( a document issued by A authorizing
the bearer to draw money from another bank at once) then the intervals
τA→B i τB→Amay be equal (the arbitrage
1
2O). We have already discussed
two representatives of the family λO because 0O=sbO and 1O=scO. Note
that the logarithmic rate of return is a decreasing function of λ. This follows
from the fact that the greater the λ is, the smaller is the length of the whole
time of using the heat reservoir B. So the algorithms sbO and scO give the
extreme values of profits possible by carrying out one of the procedures λO.
6 The temperature of an arbitrage
The present authors have proposed to use temperature, that is the Lagrange
multiplier T−1 as a measure of the financial gain [4]. This parameter allows
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to compare financial achievements on different market and during different
time scales. The thermodynamically conjugated to the temperature entropy
allows to measure qualities of a financial expert or adviser. The market
analyzed in this paper corresponds to a two level physical system with the
energies −Rmax end −Rmin. We assign, according to the maximal entropy
principle, to groups of investors achieving equal logarithmic rates of return R
a representative canonical ensemble. The temperature T−1 of the ensemble
is given by the following function of R [4]
T−1R = ln
R−Rmin
Rmax −R
, (11)
where Rmin and Rmax are the lowest and the highest rates in the considered
interval, respectively. We may use the formula (11) for all real values of R
after fixing the branch of the logarithm. For the rates R /∈ [Rmin, Rmax] we
get
T−1
R
= ln
(
(−1) ·
R−Rmin
R−Rmax
)
= ipi + ln
R−Rmin
R−Rmax
. (12)
Note that contrary to the additive rates case [4] the presently discussed ar-
bitrage should be prized the more the lower the real part of the temperature
T−1 is. May by we should call financial oscillators only those arbitrages
with non-zero imaginary parts of the temperature? If we determine the
proposed temperatures for the oscillators sbO0.3 (the second column of the
Table 1) and sbO1.93 (the third column of the Table 1) then we get the
results presented in the Table 2.
Negative temperatures characterize financial activities unprofitable even on
a developed efficient market [4]. It is worth to note that the temperatures
T−1 lower than T−1
∗
=2.0438 (see the Table 2) also correspond to disadvan-
tageous achievements because during that period the temperature T−1
∗
was
easily achieved by every citizen of Poland who possessed goods of everyday
use (and no local money). Therefore the first column of the Table 1 presents
doubtful financial achievements. For scO0.3 with CW the profit is positive
only if N = 13 what call in question the possibility of using this oscillator
as a tool in making capital in Poland of the early nineties. And we have
neglected the substantial starting and clearing costs of such an arbitrage! It
would be interesting to know if and to what extent arbitrages of the type
sbO0.3 implemented by Polish banks served as a driving force of the hyper-
inflation. Such an oscillator might consist in giving credits in Polish z loty
and accepting deposits in foreign bills. The inflation was brought under
8
RB(0,N)−RA(0,N)= 0.3 1.93
N = 1 -1.8352 2.0438= T−1
∗
2 -1.3466 ipi+1.3985
3 -0.96825 ipi+0.83187
4 -0.64536 ipi+0.60114
5 -0.35222 ipi+0.47243
6 -0.073428 ipi+0.38968
7 0.20252 ipi+0.33182
8 0.48643 ipi+0.28903
9 0.79113 ipi+0.25606
10 1.13565 ipi+0.22988
11 1.5554 ipi+0.20857
12 2.1375 ipi+0.19089
Table 2: Temperatures T−1 of the sbO arbitages
control simultaneously with the exhaustion of foreign currencies savings of
the population. It seems that this substantially slackened the inflation.
7 Concluding remarks
There is a well known Polish ex-minister, a professor of physics, who did not
notice a deficit of a billion in the department under his control though it
was noticed by his sister, a provincial teacher. We remember public guesses
concerning the sources of Bagsik’s fortune. We hope that our arguments
limit the inclination towards drawing hasty conclusions from oversimplified
models of financial phenomena.
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